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Abstract
Governance and Merger Activity in Banking
by
Thomas J. Piskula

Adviser: Professor Gayle L. DeLong
One method of evaluating the success of management decisions regarding acquisitions is
to examine equity price movements as the news of the merger is made public. The price
movement of the acquiring firm’s equity around the announcement of the acquisition
indicates if shareholders believe management has acted in their interest. In the banking
industry, researchers have found that on average equity values of the acquiring bank do
not display abnormal positive returns upon announcement, and often display statistically
significant negative returns. Another line of research has documented that CEOs are
better compensated for managing larger organizations, particularly when involved in
merger activity. This study investigates the possibility of a linkage between weak firmlevel corporate governance structures at banks and their propensity to make acquisitions
that produce negative reactions from equity holders. A commercially-sold governance
index from Institutional Shareholder Services is used to measure governance strength.
Acquisition events are from the comprehensive Thomson Reuters SDC merger database
and equity values are from CRSP. I find that weaker corporate governance is associated
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with inferior stock market reactions upon announcement of an acquisition. This result
should be of interest to regulators as they monitor corporate actions for covert motives,
and to investors in their investment selection process. I then explore which aspects of
corporate governance have the most significant connection to the equity market
reception. Surprisingly, a parsimonious index of two factors has the explanatory power
of the 55 available governance attributes in this bank merger context. I also show that in
this dataset, which is composed of US banks purchasing US entities, acquirers with
stronger (weaker) governance have a propensity to select targets with stronger (weaker)
governance. Lastly, for cases in which the target firm is a bank that is publicly held or
that has an ultimate parent that is publicly held, I investigate whether good governance at
the target or its parent is associated with more positive movement of the acquirer’s equity
price at the time of the merger announcement. The results are robust to the use of a bank
sector market index in place of the overall market index.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Mergers and acquisitions are one method of increasing the size, scope and profit potential
of a firm. They can also enhance the prestige and power of the manager who oversees
the deal. Theory suggests that shareholders would hire the agents that can produce the
highest risk-adjusted returns net of compensation and monitoring costs. Yet the
academic literature on mergers and acquisitions reveals an intriguing result. When
considering publicly traded companies, returns that seem to be associated with the merger
announcements are solidly positive for the target but are on either side of zero for the
acquirer, with factors such as industry, public or private ownership, market conditions,
transaction size, method of payment and country factors sometimes influencing the
outcome. Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) characterize the research findings by
writing, “In fact, acquiring firm shareholders appear to come dangerously close to
actually subsidizing these transactions.” When focusing on the banking industry,
researchers have found that, on average, equity values of an acquiring bank do not
display abnormal positive returns upon announcement, and often display statistically
significant negative returns.
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Considering all industries, Chari, Ouimet and Tesar (2006) provide the following list of
some of the possible explanations:

(i) zero returns correspond to “normal” returns in the competitive process
(Weston, Siu and Johnson, 2001)
(ii) difficulties exist in measuring announcement returns such as anticipation and
the relative size of targets (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989)
(iii) competing bids exist for the target
(iv) acquirer stock is used as a method of payment (Andrade, Mitchell, Stafford,
2001)
(v) negative returns are the result of bad acquisitions attributable to managerial
hubris or overconfidence (Heaton, 2002; Roll, 1986).

As early as Manne (1965) and continuing through authors such as Roll (1986), Bliss and
Rosen (2001), Heaton (2002), Cornett et al. (2003), Girma, Thompson and Wright
(2006), and Harford and Li (2007), researchers have speculated that agents are pursuing
acquisitions for their own purposes, and despite a lack of compelling financial benefit to
the acquirer shareholders. This study seeks to bring together two lines of academic
research to investigate the question. The first is the finding that merger announcements
tend to result in no gain, or worse, for the acquirer. The second is the research on the
principal-agent conflict within the framework of corporate governance at the level of the
firm.
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Much of the relevant multi-industry research does not include banks. Some exclude all
financial companies in order to focus more closely on the tangible side of the economy
(Bruno and Claessens, 2007). Some exclude all regulated industries, such as banks and
utility companies, in order to focus on the unconstrained decisions of market participants
(Aggarwal et al., 2007 and also Doukas and Petmezas, 2007). In either case, banks are
excluded.

Banks provide a compelling industry to study for a variety of reasons:

1) a well-developed and well-regulated banking system is necessary for the further
development of the financial sector,
2) one requirement of regulators is to continually improve their understanding of the risks
that banks are taking, including those associated with mergers and acquisitions,
3) to some degree the costs of distress or insolvency for banks is ultimately borne by
taxpayers,
4) banks are important for the smooth functioning and the growth of the economy in
countries with well-developed financial markets and are critical in countries with poorlydeveloped financial markets,
5) banks are often more subject to expropriation or self-dealing by the political elite,
6) insights gained by studying banks may be applicable to other industries,
7) due to their high level of regulation, banks generate somewhat more data than other
industries.
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Bank merger and acquisition activity is significantly different from that of other
industries in several ways. They tend to be friendlier, with very few hostile takeovers,
and they tend to be consummated more often than in other industries (Becher, 2000).
Additionally, they must be approved by dedicated groups of regulators, and if crossborder they must be approved by regulators in both the home and host countries. As
discussed in Amihud et al. (2002) and Buch and DeLong (2004), there is a possibility that
firms may be motivated to merge in order to change their risk posture relative to the
market and relative to their pre-merger positioning with regulators.

The study of how corporate governance issues relate to bank merger activity is important
because of the possibility that the individual self-interest of managers is affecting not
only shareholder wealth, but also national economic variables such as the level of risk in
the economy, the pace of development, and taxpayer wealth. Regulators need to
continually improve their understanding of, and ability to monitor, the risks that banks
decide to take. With these larger constituencies in mind, an investigation into how
principal-agent issues may be a component of merger and acquisition activity in the
banking industry is compelling.

The focus of this study is on the acquirer’s decision to enter into the transaction, and how
the owners of the acquirer fare at announcement. Therefore I do not pursue the question
of whether the merger of the two entities into one enterprise creates or destroys value
relative to the valuations of the two firms as independent entities. That is an interesting,
but different, research question that is separately pursued in the literature.
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This study brings broad, commercial-quality, firm-level governance data to bear in the
investigation of bank mergers. It contributes to the literature by revealing that a linkage
can be found for banks between weaker corporate governance and poorly received
merger announcements. It gives insight to regulators regarding where less constrained
bank management may be creating larger organizations for their own purposes, and
therefore be deserving of enhanced scrutiny. It also highlights to investors the potential
benefits of using this type of governance data in their investment selection process.
Additionally, it gives some insight into which components of corporate governance are
most closely associated with the equity market reception of an acquiring bank’s merger
announcement. Furthermore, it shows that when public US banks choose to acquire other
public US banks, or from a public ultimate parent, banks with stronger (weaker)
governance have a propensity to select targets with stronger (weaker) governance.
Lastly, it suggests that when considering acquisitions of banks, stronger governance of
the target (or its parent) contributes positively to the market reaction as judged by the
acquirer’s equity value.

This study examines all US bank mergers from 2001 to 2006 for which firm-level
governance data are available for the acquirer. An event study methodology is used to
construct a quantitative measure, the cumulative abnormal return or CAR, of the market
reaction to the merger announcement. In order to obtain many of the results in this study,
the CAR is regressed against the governance data and against control variables that have
been shown to be meaningful in previous research. In order to investigate the tendency
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of acquirers to select targets with similar governance strength, a regression of target
governance strength against acquirer governance strength and control variables is done.

The organization of the sections below is as follows: Section 2 is a review of the
literature. Section 3 contains a presentation of the hypotheses. Section 4 is an
explanation of the methodology. Section 5 contains a review of the data sources. The
results of the investigation of the linkage between governance strength and acquirer
equity price movements are presented in section 6. Section 7 is an analysis of the
various aspects of acquirer corporate governance and an examination of alternate
measures. Section 8 is an examination of the role of the target’s governance when the
target is a bank. It also contains the results showing that acquirers tend to select targets
with similar governance strength. Section 9 contains a robustness check. The major
hypotheses of this study are re-examined using a different index to represent the overall
market. The conclusion is in section 10.

Throughout this study the words merger and acquisition will be used interchangeably, as
will the words acquirer and bidder. Also the words agents and management will be used
interchangeably. Since this study focuses only on the wealth effects for the acquirer, and
not of the target, the words owners, principals, shareholders, and stockholders will also
be used interchangeably.
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Chapter 2

Literature Review

In reviewing the literature on the effect on bidder wealth from the announcement of a
merger, I focus below primarily on research from the year 2000 forward. Studies before
2000 tended to use significantly smaller samples, although the results are similar. Becher
(2000) and Schmautzer (2006) contain informative reviews of studies before 2000. The
effect of the announcement of the intent to merge on shareholder wealth is typically
studied by applying an event study methodology. As mentioned above, there is a divide
in the literature between the research that examines merger activity among the general
population of business entities and the studies that focus on banks.

Reviewing the academic literature on market reactions to mergers in the general
population of business entities is a beneficial starting point for several reasons. First, it
contains the historical beginnings of this line of research. As such it addresses
fundamental issues of methodology. It also displays the different style options that have
developed.
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Second, major findings regarding mergers and acquisitions are generally first made in the
literature regarding the general population. Research on bank M&A then can highlight
differences from the findings for the general population.

Third, there are some differences in governance tendencies between banks and the
general corporate population. Bathala et al. (2007) contains an overview of differences.
An exposure to the literature for the general population of entities involved in mergers
helps to give meaning to the relevance of these differences.

Fourth, the volume of studies regarding the general population is much larger. Only
reviewing the literature on bank-related activity would miss or under represent some
aspects of this line of inquiry.

Similar to the literature on mergers, there is a divide in the literature regarding corporate
governance between research focused on the general population and the much smaller
amount of research focused on banks. I will review some of the literature on corporate
governance regarding the general population, focusing on items that I believe will aid in
giving context to this study regarding banks.

2.1 Literature Regarding the General Population

As mentioned above, CEO and management hubris has been advanced as a possible
explanation of why acquirers enter into mergers that seem undesirable to their
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shareholders, as evidenced by a destruction of value at announcement. In Hayward and
Hambrick (1997) the authors construct measures of CEO hubris containing such items as
CEO compensation, CEO media praise, and recent company performance. They find that
acquirer shareholder wealth losses increased as their measures of CEO hubris increased.
The effect was particularly strong if board oversight was weak. The strength of board
oversight was measured by the percentage of insiders on the board, if the CEO served as
the board chair, and the amount of equity holdings of the outside directors.

LaPorta et al. (2002) is an example of research in which the authors use country-level
governance indicators, often referred to as investor protections, and show that they are
relevant to corporate valuations and shareholder wealth. Although this article is not
directly related to M&A, this country-level approach became used by researchers
examining mergers involving entities in different countries.

Bris and Cabolis (2003) use country-level measures as an indicator of the quality of
governance and apply them to cross-border mergers. Within a country they create
governance indicators by industry. Their findings indicate that an entity that forms from
a merger will tend to adopt the higher governance standard, either from the acquirer’s or
the target’s country, even though it may not be necessary by law.

Mueller and Yurtoglu (2007) examine mergers grouped by country. They conclude that
mergers in continental Europe do more poorly than those in the United States and
countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand when performance is measured
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over time. They suggest that management empire building may be at work given the
weaker country governance framework in continental Europe as compared to the
comparison countries.

Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) were some of the first researchers to use a numeric
index to represent the quality of governance at an individual company. The index the
authors created has become popular with academics investigating corporate governance.
The authors find that firms with stronger corporate governance have better business
results, and make fewer acquisitions.

Grinstein and Hribar (2004) find that CEOs with more power over the board of directors
tend to do larger acquisitions and the acquisitions are received more negatively. They
assess CEO power over the board via factors such as CEO membership on the
nominating committee, if the CEO seems influential in selecting new board members,
and if the CEO is the also the board chair. They also find that more powerful CEOs
receive larger bonuses upon completion of the merger.

In a 2007 study of firms in the United Kingdom, Doukas and Petmezas focused on the
theme of overconfidence and self-attribution bias. They used high order acquisition deals
and insider dealings as indicators of overconfidence. They were able to find evidence
supporting the view that overconfident bidders realize lower announcement-related
returns. In another study of UK firms, Girma et al. (2006) document the link between
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firm size and CEO compensation. The authors find that CEOs are able to increase their
compensation via acquisitions.

Harford and Li (2007) investigate U.S. acquirers and also show that CEOs receive
positive compensation effects from mergers. They find that even in mergers in which
bidding shareholders are worse off, bidding CEOs are better off three quarters of the
time. Additionally they find that following a merger, a CEO’s pay and overall wealth
become insensitive to negative stock performance, but a CEO’s wealth rises in step with
positive stock performance. In an interesting comparison, they find that CEOs are not
rewarded for undertaking major capital expenditures. The authors also find that
corporate governance plays a role in CEO compensation within the M&A context.
Bidding firms with stronger boards relative to the CEO, defined as CEOs with belowaverage tenure at the time of the acquisition, retain the sensitivity of their CEOs’
compensation to poor performance following the merger.

Bruno and Claessens (2007) find that firm-level indicators were much more helpful in
revealing the effects of strong or weak corporate governance than country-level
indicators. They find that firm-level indicators had a notable relationship with firm
valuation whereas country-level indicators did not.

In Masulis et al. (2007), firm-level governance indicators are brought to bear on
shareholder wealth changes upon the announcement of the intent to merge. The authors
find that firms with more anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) generate greater destruction of
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shareholder wealth upon announcement than firms with fewer ATPs. They also find that
firms that separate the positions of chairman and CEO earn higher abnormal returns at
announcement.

Choi and Huang (2008) use similar firm-level ATP data and examine cross-border
mergers. Their findings do not confirm the findings of Masilus et al. (2007).
Unexpectedly they find that firms with higher ATPs had higher cumulative abnormal
returns (CARs) at the announcement of the cross-border deals. This is despite the fact
that they paid higher premiums for the targets. There does not yet seem to be a cohesive
line of reasoning to put these results into context with other research.

2.2 Literature Focused on Banks

In reviewing the literature regarding banks, I first review research that documents the
tendency for acquirer abnormal returns to be on average near zero or negative, and
research that highlights related, but not governance, considerations. I then review articles
that incorporate issues of bank governance.

As an example of earlier bank merger research, Becher (2000) examines 558 US bank
merger events from 1980 to 1997 and finds that over a 36-day event window cumulative
returns to bidders are not significantly different from zero, but over a shorter, 11-day,
window that bidder losses are negative and statistically significant.
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DeLong (2001) finds that bidders involved in mergers that increase corporate focus in
both geography and activity do not, on average, destroy shareholder wealth upon
announcement. Bidders that were not pursuing this degree of focus, and bidders that
were diversifying, fared worse.

Using a 12-day window, DeLong (2003 (a)) finds that the average returns to acquirers
involved in US domestic bank mergers are negative and significant. Interestingly, she
finds that in domestic bank mergers within countries with equity markets that are less
well developed than that of the US, the average CAR is higher. This study is an indicator
that the diverse and more portfolio-oriented nature of the equity holdings in more
financially-developed countries may bring the associated effect of more difficulty
controlling agents and so bring more mergers that reduce acquirer shareholder wealth.

Bank managers seem to learn from previous mergers. DeLong and DeYoung (2007),
using 216 mergers between 1987 and 1999, were able to show that bank managers appear
to learn from the previous mergers in the industry, and make the experiences in later
years better than in earlier years.

Although the focus of DeLong and DeYoung (2007) is primarily on long-term bank
accounting results, it also suggests that market participants may be improving their ability
to evaluate, at announcement date, which mergers will result in improved results over
time. In this regard, the authors make the point that the ability of market participants to
foresee the ultimate effects of the bank merger is low generally. This learning by
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observing on the part of market participants is an interesting extension of the work done
in DeLong (2003 (b)) in which the author shows that market participants display some
skill in predicting at the time of announcement the long-term benefits of mergers that
build some types of enterprise focus but not the same skill when evaluating mergers that
build other types of enterprise focus.

The following literature concerning banks contains aspects of bank corporate governance.

Bliss and Rosen (2001) find that mergers had a positive impact on CEO compensation,
particularly via the effect of the size of the bank. They also find that compensation
generally increased despite negative market reactions to the merger announcement.
Interestingly, they additionally found that CEOs with more stock-based compensation
entered into fewer mergers.

Cornett et al. (2003) investigate a possible linkage between governance variables
surrounding CEO age, CEO equity exposure and incentive compensation, block
ownership, and board characteristics to CARs resulting from a merger announcement.
They find a relationship for focusing mergers but not diversifying mergers. For focusing
mergers they find an average CAR near zero, and for diversifying mergers a significantly
negative average CAR.

Hagendorff et al. (2007) review the existing literature on the linkage between the strength
of corporate governance and bank merger results, and then call for more investigation
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into the question. They characterize it as a compelling line of inquiry given the
dependence on the banking sector for economic well being, and on the opacity of banking
risk. It worth noting that their opinions and their call for further research were issued
before the financial crisis that began in 2008.

Hagendorff et al. (2008) use country-level data and find that acquirers that purchase
targets in countries with fewer investor protections tend to have less negative CARs at
announcement. Although they do not highlight it as such, this result is consistent with
the governance mechanisms of the acquirer (the party with the stronger governance
mechanisms) being brought to bear on the combined entity, thereby enhancing the value
of the combined entity more than if there was little difference in the governance of the
two parties at the outset. The amount of the value enhancement is greater, the bigger the
difference in governance between the two parties.

Hagendorff et al. (2009) again use country-level data and investigate whether board
monitoring of bank management seems to be less attentive when there is a more stringent
regulatory regime. They find that board monitoring seems to be more attentive when
there is a more stringent regulatory regime. The two oversight entities seem to
compliment the efforts of each other.
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Chapter 3

Hypotheses

The empirical analysis in this study is primarily designed to test a component of the
principal-agent hypothesis as it may be functioning in US banks, stated broadly as
managers will act in their own interests rather than the interest of shareholders if they are
not monitored and controlled. Specifically, the manifestation of the principal-agent
hypothesis examined is that given weaker constraints by shareholders, bank managers
display a higher propensity to make acquisitions that destroy shareholder value when
announced.

The benefits to management of the acquirer from making an acquisition are well
documented in the literature (e.g. Harford and Li, 2007). Yet in this study I choose to be
cautious about making a blanket causal assertion between the existence of corporate
governance mechanisms at a bank and the assumption that shareholders are constraining
management. I want to allow for the theoretical possibility that there are some “good”
corporate cultures or “good” managers that promote both better acquisitions and the use
of stronger governance mechanisms. Even with this caution, investigating the linkage
between governance and acquisitions is compelling because it is reasonable to believe
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that in some, perhaps most, cases the constraints of the governance mechanism may be
restraining or influencing management. At a minimum, strong corporate governance
mechanisms serve as a signal to investors that either a “good” situation is in place or that
“bad” managers would be somewhat constrained.

In order to examine the linkage between governance strength and acquirer wealth effects
at announcement empirically, I create the following testable hypotheses:

H1: Bank mergers tend to destroy shareholder wealth at announcement on average.

A finding in support of this hypothesis would agree with the extant literature.

H2: Weaker corporate governance at the acquiring firm level is associated with a greater
destruction of acquirer shareholder wealth at announcement on average.

A finding in agreement with this hypothesis would document that stronger corporate
governance measures indicate on average a more positive reception of the announcement
of an acquisition and less destruction of shareholder wealth. This result would be
potentially significant to regulators and investors.

Additionally, I seek to build on the rather sparse literature regarding the significance of
the governance environment at the target. I examine the following two hypotheses:
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H3: Acquirers with stronger governance tend to acquire entities with weaker
governance.

This hypothesis is motivated by the findings in Hagendorff et al. (2008) in which targets
from countries with fewer investor protections tended to have less negative CARs at
announcement. This tendency combines in an intriguing way with the finding in Bris and
Cabolis (2003) that a combined entity will bring the higher of the two parties’ governance
standard to the new entity, and with the finding of Bruno and Claessens (2007) that
stronger firm-level governance leads to higher firm valuation. In formulating the
hypothesis in this way I am assuming that 1) there is a benefit to be garnered by seeking a
merger partner at the opposite end of the governance spectrum, 2) that the motivation to
garner that potential benefit for acquirer shareholders will be recognizable among the
other motivations of the principals, and 3) that research findings generated using crossborder mergers would apply to US domestic mergers.

With similar motivation and foundation I test the following hypothesis:

H4: Targets with weaker governance relative to the average governance strength of
targets are associated with less destruction of acquirer’s shareholder wealth at
announcement.
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Chapter 4

Methodology

An event study methodology is used to evaluate the market reaction on acquirer equity to
the announcement of the merger. To briefly review the terminology, the merger
announcement is the event, and is said to happen on day 0. An observation window
measured in number of days is established around the date of the event. Following
Masulis et al. (2007) this study uses a 5 day window around the announcement, 2 days
before the announcement date, day -2, and 2 days after, day +2.

The return that would have been expected during the announcement window if there had
been no announcement is calculated. This study follows the literature in using the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to create the expected return. The CAPM
parameters alpha and beta are estimated by considering the individual stock and market
movements during a period 255 trading days in length ending 46 trading days before the
event. The CRSP equal-weighted market index is the benchmark market return. The
expected individual stock return is compared to the actual return. The difference is
designated as the abnormal return, attributable to the event. This calculation is done on a
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daily basis for each day in the event window. The sum of the daily abnormal returns for
the entire window is called the cumulative abnormal return, or CAR.

(1)

ARit = Rit – (αi + βiRMt)

2

(2)

CARi =

∑

ARit

t =−2

Where

αi and βi are the parameters generated by the CAPM estimation process
ARit = the abnormal return for stock i on day t
Rit = return on stock i on day t
RMt = the return of the market on day t
CARi = the cumulative abnormal return on stock i for the event

A comprehensive, commercially-marketed, governance index is used to indicate the
strength of corporate governance. The governance index value for each company is reevaluated annually, and the value for the year of the event is used. The data provider
refers to this as the Corporate Governance Quotient, or CGQ. In equation (3) below, it is
referred to as the Industry CGQ because it is calculated relative to other firms in the
banking industry.
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With the CAR as the dependent variable and the governance indicator as the explanatory
variable of particular interest, an OLS process is used to assess the relationship. Control
variables that have proven helpful in other studies are included. Bruner (2005) provides a
comprehensive review of the literature, which documents the importance of these control
variables in previous research.

The control variables are:

1. The transaction size, as measured by the consideration paid divided by the total assets
of the acquirer. Previous research (Moeller et al., 2004) has shown that larger
transactions tend to receive a cooler, or more negative, reception by market participants.

2. A dummy variable for public targets. Previous research (Koeplin et al., 2000) has
found that purchases of private targets are better received in the market. The common
interpretation is that private companies are often acquired more cheaply than public
companies.

3. A dummy variable for cash-only consideration and a dummy variable for shares-only
consideration. This leaves the base case as those transactions with hybrid consideration,
either a combination or a choice of cash and shares. Previous research (Travlos, 1987)
has shown that cash-only consideration is correlated with a more positive reception by
market participants upon announcement.
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4. Dummy variables for each year 2001 through 2005. This leaves 2006 as the base
case. Previous studies (Dong et al., 2006) have shown that merger and acquisition deals
done in “hot markets” often result in overpayment, and a more negative reception upon
announcement. Hot markets are characterized by a higher quantity of transactions and by
higher average and total dollar volume. The amount of merger and acquisition activity in
the economy moves in waves, with several years of high activity, or hot markets,
followed by several years of lower activity, or cool markets.

5. Dummy variables for the most popular market index in which the acquiring company
is a member. Brown and Caylor (2006) showed that corporate governance strength rises
as company size increases. Rather than using the log of total acquirer assets in this study,
I have chosen to use market indexes that are arranged by size: the S&P 500 for large
capitalization companies, S&P 400 for mid-cap, S&P 600 small-cap, Russell 3000 for
companies not within the S&P indexes, and, following the data providers lead, a
remainder for others, called the CGQ Universe. The premise behind this choice is that
investors may often compare corporate governance functioning within these groupings,
rather than on a continuum of asset size. The data are coded so that the S&P 500 is the
base case.

The regression equation used to test hypothesis 2, the linkage between CAR and
governance strength, with i as the subscript representing the event and ε representing the
random effect, is:
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(3)

CARi=a+β1Sizei+β2Publici+β3Cashi+β4Sharesi+β52001i+β62002i+β72003i+β82004i+

β92005i+Β10S&P400i+β11S&P600i+β12Russell3000i+β13CGQUniversei+β14Industry
CGQi+εi

The regression equation used to test hypothesis 4, the linkage between target governance
strength and CAR is similar but does not contain the public target indicator (because only
public targets can be examined for governance) and the year 2001 and 2002 indicators
due to data availability restrictions. The target’s CGQ is added to the equation, and is the
variable of interest. To give context to the target’s CGQ, I also add the target’s index.
The equation is:

(4)

CARi=a+β1Sizei+β2Cashi+β3Sharesi+β42003i+β52004i+β62005i+

β7Acq Industry CGQi+β8Acq S&P 400i+β9Acq S&P 600i+β10Acq Russell 3000i+β11Acq
CGQUniversei+β12Target Industry CGQi+β13Target S&P 400i+β14Target S&P
600i+β15Target Russell 3000i+β16Target CGQUniversei +εi

To test hypothesis 3, regarding the prediction of the target’s governance strength from the
acquirer’s governance strength and control variables, I use a regression with the target’s
governance strength as the dependent variable, the acquirer’s governance strength as the
independent variable of interest, and a variety of model specifications with various
control variables.
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Chapter 5

Data Sources

Merger announcement events are taken from the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum
database. The following initial criteria are used to select the events:

1. The acquirer and the target must be US companies.

2. The acquirer must be a public company. This criterion removes private acquirers and
acquirers that are wholly-owned or partially-owned subsidiaries of other companies.

3. The acquirer must have SIC code 6021, national-charter commercial bank, 6022,
state-charter commercial bank or 6029, commercial banks not elsewhere classified.

4. Announcement date must be from January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2006.

5. Deal size must be at least $50 million. This criterion eliminates deals that may be too
small to be actively followed by market participants.
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6. The transaction must have closed. The deal status must be “Completed”.

7. There must have been a change of control of the target. The acquirer must have held
less than 50% of the target’s shares before the transaction, and more than 51% after
completion. In practice, the percentage of the target held by the acquirer almost always
moves from 0 to 100%. In this study all the events fit that pattern except three, which
moved from 0 to 62%, 75% and 86%.

8. Both acquirer’s total assets and deal size values must be available.

Equity prices come from the Center for Research in Security Prices database, often know
by its acronym CRSP. The Eventus software program from Cowan Research is used to
access the CRSP data, perform the CAPM estimation, calculate the CARs, and generate
some summary statistics. Eventus is designed to facilitate event studies that use CRSP
data as the equity price input. The equal-weighted CRSP market index is used. The
CRSP PERMNO and the event date are used together to uniquely identify each event and
to link events to the associated equity prices.

After the events were identified and the equity price information was retrieved, each
announcement event was then matched by bank name and announcement year to the
governance data for the particular acquirer or target for the relevant year. CUSIPs are
also used to identify the banks in 2003 through 2006. CUSIPs are not part of the
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governance data for 2001 and 2002. There were 228 events for which all initial acquirer
data are available.

To gauge the strength of corporate governance, the Industry Corporate Governance
Quotient (CGQ) measure devised by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) is used.
This measure gives a numeric assessment to each company, ranging from 0 to 100, versus
a comparison group of companies in the same industry.

The availability of accessible governance data by company has traditionally been limited.
The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), a commercial organization, was the
first to gather and organize firm-level data. Gompers et al. (2003) use these data to create
the first widely available index, or score, of governance by company. IRRC was
purchased by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), which collects a wider range of
governance data. In 2007 ISS was acquired by RiskMetrics. In 2010 RiskMetrics was
acquired by MSCI Barra. For this study I actively pursued permission from the vendor to
use the commercially-sold ISS data rather than use the more limited data in the older
IRRC form.

ISS developed its own measure of corporate governance strength called the Corporate
Governance Quotient (CGQ). The exact formula for the CGQ remains proprietary
although we do know that the output of the calculation process is to rank companies from
strongest to weakest governance. Then each company is given the score that corresponds
to its ranking. For example, a company score of 25 indicates that the governance of 75%
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of the comparison group is rated stronger. A score of 0 (100) indicates that the company
is the worst (best) in the comparison group. ISS provides two CGQ values. The “Index
CGQ” is for comparison to companies in the same market index. The indexes used by
ISS are the S&P 500 (large cap), S&P 400 (mid cap), S&P 600 (small cap), Russell 3000
(comprehensive), and a remainder to the “CGQ Universe”. The “Industry CGQ” is for
comparison to companies in the same industry. Considering the 228 events that meet the
criteria listed above, all but 12 have the Industry CGQ calculated versus the “Banks” peer
group by ISS. The remaining 12 are calculated versus the “Diversified Financials” peer
group. In this study the Industry CGQ is used and these 12 events are dropped in order to
maintain the single-industry focus and the comparability between acquirers. There are
216 remaining events.
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Chapter 6

Results of the Linkage between Acquirer Governance
and Market Reaction

The data are summarized in Table 1.
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Table 1: Summary of acquisition events and acquirer and target characteristics.
N=216
Mean

Median Max

Min

Standard
Deviation

CAR

-0.0105 -0.0081 0.0963

-0.1264 0.035

Industry CGQ

64.22

68.30

100.00

0.50

Deal / Acquirer
Total Assets, %

3.40%

1.78%

48.48% 0.02%

Public Target
Private Target

Count
145
71

26.79

5.05%

All Cash
36
Hybrid Payment 111
All Stock
69
Event Year
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

28
22
41
44
34
47

Market Index
S&P 500
S&P 400
S&P 600
Russell 3000
CGQ Universe

62
30
29
86
9

In order to assess support for hypothesis 1, that mergers tend to destroy shareholder
wealth at announcement on average, the cumulative abnormal returns must be examined
to see if the anticipated negative market reactions are evident. A finding of negative
CARs would confirm hypothesis 1. The mean cumulative abnormal return, or average
shareholder loss attributable to the event, for the 216 events is -1.05%. There were 79
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events with positive CARs and 137 events with negative CARs. Recall that the CAR is a
difference, between the expected and actual stock return during the event window. In
examining the statistical significance of this difference, the null hypothesis is that the
expected difference is zero, reflecting that the event has no impact on stock returns. The
large-sample, generalized sign test for this division of 79 positive and 137 negative
results can be assessed using the formula and values below where,
q = the quantity of negative CAR results,
n = the number of observations, and
p = the probability, 0.5, associated with the null hypothesis that the expected division
between positive and negative CAR results is an even split.
(5)

z=(q-np)/√(np(1-p))=(137-216(0.5))/√(216(0.5)(0.5))≈ 3.9

The test is significant at the 1% level. I would prefer not to rely simply on the terms onetailed or two-tailed test. Note that when a z-value of 3.9 is applied to one half of the
normal distribution, it covers an area of about .4990, leaving 0.001 in the tail. In an
application such as this, where a result of 137 negative values implies the necessity of 79
positive values (unless a CAR of exactly 0.00 is recorded), this amount of probability in
each of the two tails should be combined before assessing significance. Here, the sum of
the two probabilities, 0.002, allows a claim of significance at the conventional 1% level.

The Wilcoxon signed-rank test incorporates both the sign of the difference and its level,
and so uses more information than the generalized sign test above. Both tests are
nonparametric and so do not make an assumption about the underlying probability
distribution, but the Wilcoxon test adds the assumption that the distribution is symmetric
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around the mean (Hogg et al., 2005). In this application the CARs are ranked by absolute
value from lowest to highest and given a rank number from 1 to 216. The rank number
of the negative CARs is totaled, in this case to 15,655. The expected value of this total
for the null hypothesis is n(n+1)/4 and the variance is n(n+1)(2n+1)/24 (Winkler and
Hayes, 1975). The Z value, appropriate for large samples, is given by the formula:

(6)

z=(total negative rankings – n(n+1)/4) / √(n(n+1)(2n+1)/24)
= (15,655-216(217)/4) / √(216(217)(432+1)/24) ≈ 4.3

This is significant at the 1% level. Clearly the results support H1 and confirm the
observations of other researchers that on average bank merger announcements tend to
cause a loss in the wealth of acquirer shareholders.

As to whether weaker corporate governance at the firm level is associated with a greater
destruction of shareholder wealth at announcement on average, hypothesis 2, the results
of the OLS regression are in Table 2. The independent variables in bold and marked
with asterisks are significant at the 1% (***) level or stronger. When considering the
coefficient results, note that the average CAR is in the format of 0.0105, which represents
1.05% of shareholder wealth.

In reviewing the results for the control variables, the coefficients for the consideration
type indicators, Cash and Shares, are extremely small and not statistically significant.
Conversely, the coefficient for the public target indicator is significant at the 1% level.
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At -0.01400, the coefficient for the public indicator reveals an average predicted 1.400%
differential in shareholder wealth between transactions involving public and private
targets. The actual breakdown of the average CAR values for this dataset is an average
of -0.0164 for the 145 public targets and 0.00116 for the 71 private targets. This finding
is consistent with the findings concerning the “private firm discount” in the literature
regarding the general population of companies. Capron and Shen (2007) explore this
discount in detail as it relates to the merger activity of the general population. Their
results show that on average, shareholders lose more than one percent of value for
transactions involving public targets and an average return to shareholders that is positive
but less than one percent for transactions involving private targets.

The deal size indicator is also significant at stronger than the 1% level. One approach to
considering the economic impact of an independent variable is to multiply its estimated
coefficient times its standard deviation, called “Effect Size” in Sanders (2002). For the
deal size indicator, the coefficient of -0.19916 times the standard deviation of 0.0505
(about 5% of acquirer total assets) would create an expected change in shareholder
wealth of -0.1005 or -1.005% of shareholder wealth at announcement. It is worth noting
that this variable has a mean value of 0.0340, or 3.4% of acquirer total assets, so a
hypothetical change of one standard deviation from the mean would have to be an
increase in deal size, to about 8.4% of acquirer total assets, not a decrease.

The dummy variables for each year yield one year in which the estimated coefficient is
statistically significant. The 2002 coefficient of 0.03112 was significant at the 1% level.
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Transactions that were announced in 2002 added on average 3.112% to shareholder
wealth over transactions that were announced in 2006. 2002 was the trough of a cool
acquisition market, after the wild markets of the late 1990s and the bust in Spring 2000.
It is worth remembering that acquisitions take a long time to negotiate and then
announce, particularly transactions involving banks which may involve preannouncement communication with their associated regulators.

The S&P 400 and S&P 600 variables fall just short of the 5% significance level, while
the Russell 3000 variable is not significant and the CGQ Universe is significant at the 1%
level. Recall that the base case is the S&P 500. Results in Table 3 show that if just an
S&P 500 indicator is used, it is closer to the 5% significance level, with a p-value of
0.0516. It is just within the 5% significance level, with a p-value of 0.0473, if the
consideration type variables Cash and Shares, which add very little and have a very high
p-value, are eliminated from the regression. Alternatively, if the log of total assets is
used instead of an index indicator, it is helpful but not significant even at the 10% level. I
have chosen to use an indicator for each market index with the belief it is the most
informative arrangement.

The size of the coefficients indicates that transactions involving acquirers in the S&P 400
and S&P 600 would on average receive a 1.4% better reception than acquirers in the S&P
500. As motivation for future research, I offer the thought that acquisitions by companies
in these categories show a capability and willingness to move toward being included in
the S&P500, and then gaining the associated equity lift. Considering the CGQ Universe
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of acquirers not listed in the other indexes, the sample size is small at 9 events, but
perhaps these firms are garnering positive attention to their equity by making the
acquisition. The acquisition may also move the acquirers toward inclusion in the Russell
3000.

The explanatory variable of interest, the Industry Corporate Governance Quotient, is
significant at the 1% level. Recall that the CGQ is allowed to range from 0 to 100. The
product of one standard deviation of this variable, 26.79, times its coefficient, 0.00028,
produces an expected effect of 0.0075 or 0.75% of shareholder wealth. This measure of
corporate governance quality is indicating a characteristic, or a set of characteristics, of
the bank that is positively related to making acquisitions that are better received by
market participants. In reviewing these results, clearly governance matters and weak
governance can be costly. H2 is supported.
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Table 2: The effect of governance strength as measured by the Industry CGQ on the
cumulative abnormal return (CAR).
N=216
R Square
Adj R Square
Standard Error
F
F Significance

0.23040
0.17679
0.03214
4.29816
0.0000012

Intercept
Public Target
Cash
Stock
Deal Size
Industry CGQ
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
S&P 400
S&P 600
Russell 3000
CGQ Universe

Coefficients
-0.02796
-0.01400
0.00149
0.00171
-0.19916
0.00028
0.01033
0.03112
0.00222
0.01069
-0.00064
0.01412
0.01435
0.00646
0.03912

P-value
0.01464
0.00449
0.81293
0.74414
0.00008
0.00429
0.22178
0.00066
0.75353
0.12471
0.93065
0.05311
0.06098
0.27271
0.00339

**
***

***
***
***

***

*** (**), (*) significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level
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Table 3: Regressions using an S&P 500 indicator or log of acquirer assets to differentiate
acquirers. N=216
Regression results using a single S&P 500 indicator rather than individual indexes:
R Square
Adj R Square
Standard Error
F

0.19811
0.15487
0.03257
4.58178

Intercept
Public Target
Cash
Stock
Deal Size
Industry CGQ
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
S&P 500

Coefficients
-0.01550
-0.01555
0.00021
0.00060
-0.16407
0.00026
0.01044
0.03077
0.00206
0.01062
-0.00082
-0.01034

P-value
0.10030
0.00158
0.97383
0.90908
0.00049
0.00556
0.20614
0.00067
0.77194
0.13076
0.91218
0.05163

***

***
***
***

*

Regression results using a single S&P indicator rather than individual indexes and
dropping the consideration type:
R Square
Adj R Square
Standard Error
F

0.19806
0.16302
0.03241
5.65302

Intercept
Public Target
Deal Size
Industry CGQ
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
S&P 500

Coefficients
-0.01518
-0.01555
-0.16404
0.00026
0.01048
0.03071
0.00202
0.01069
-0.00085
-0.01021

P-value
0.09037
0.00149
0.00045
0.00451
0.19575
0.00060
0.77449
0.12464
0.90756
0.04734

*
***
***
***
***

**

*** (**), (*) significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level
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Table 3, continued
Regression results using log of acquirer assets instead of an index indicator
R Square
Adj R Square
Standard Error
F

0.19173
0.14815
0.03270
4.39920

Coefficients
Intercept
0.00489
Cash
0.00039
Stock
-0.00013
Public Target -0.01522
Deal Size
-0.17853
Industry CGQ 0.00026
2001
0.00928
2002
0.03079
2003
0.00223
2004
0.01082
2005
-0.00098
Log Assets
-0.00558

P-value
0.75947
0.95123
0.97999
0.00210
0.00043
0.00725
0.26028
0.00073
0.75524
0.12679
0.89560
0.14029

***
***
***
***

Regression results using log of acquirer assets instead of an index indicator and no
consideration type
R Square
Adj R Square
Standard Error
F

0.19171
0.15639
0.03254
5.42871

Coefficients
Intercept
0.00496
Public Target -0.01524
Deal Size
-0.17886
Industry CGQ 0.00026
2001
0.00937
2002
0.03086
2003
0.00228
2004
0.01084
2005
-0.00094
Log Assets
-0.00561

P-value
0.75477
0.00196
0.00037
0.00532
0.24681
0.00062
0.74756
0.12263
0.89916
0.12838

***
***
***
***

*** (**), (*) significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level
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Chapter 7

Acquirer Governance Measurement and Individual
Component Importance

Thus far the CGQ has been used to represent the quality of corporate governance. The
precise composition of the CGQ is proprietary, but the component data has been made
available for this study. I now review the detailed data to gain insight into what might be
the important drivers within it. The dataset starts in 2001, but the 2001 and 2002 data are
much less detailed and not directly comparable to the 2003 through 2006 data. Therefore
I only use the 2003 through 2006 data, for a total of 166 events. The 50 eliminated data
points from 2001 and 2002 represent a 23% decrease in the size of the dataset from the
original 216.

Following Aggarwal and Williamson (2006), I start with the data as it is gathered and
arranged in 2003 and 2004. The authors arrange the data into logical groupings, reprinted
in Appendix 1. I break their item numbered 33 into two separate items, one concerning
blank check preferred stock and the other concerning poison pills, so that I have 65 items
where they have 64. The data for 2005 and 2006 are in a slightly different format. I am
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able to match most items between the 03-04 year format pair and the 05-06 year format
pair, but 6 items must be dropped from the 03-04 pair because they do not appear in the
later pair. This is despite Aggarwal and Williamson identifying these items as part of
their 2005 list. They may have had access to data that ISS had not yet reformatted. The
six dropped items are in italics in the appendix list. I also drop two items with which
100% of the companies in the dataset comply:

1. All directors attended 75% of board meetings or had a valid excuse
45. No interlocks among compensation committee members

Furthermore, I drop two items with which no companies in the dataset comply:

35. Poison pill with TIDE provision
37. Poison pill with sunset provision

There are 55 governance attributes remaining in the dataset.

The purpose of this portion of the study is not to reverse-engineer the CGQ, but rather to
identify the important governance practices in a bank merger context. ISS collects its
data in a detailed way. As an example, there might be 5 categories of board size such as
5 directors or less, 6 to 8 directors, 9 to 12, 13 to 15, and 16 or more, and each company
is fit into one category. ISS does not give a firm opinion on what is a minimum or
acceptable strength of governance, but does publish a guide to best practices. Using the
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perspective within Brown and Caylor (2006), Aggarwal and Williamson (2006) and the
ISS guide, a reasonable divide can be established between better and lesser governance
practices. I code each acquirer in the year of its acquisition as better or lesser (1 or 0) on
each of the 55 attributes. To continue with the board size example, all sizes between 6
and 15 are coded as better, a value of 1. A finding of less than 6, more than 15, or no
data available is coded as lesser, a value of 0.

As a first step in investigating the detailed governance information, I replace the Industry
CGQ with a simple sum of the number of the better ratings attributed to a company. The
correlation between the two measures is 0.803. The OLS regression using the CGQ has
an adjusted R squared of 0.1803. The same regression using the sum has an adjusted R
squared of 0.1797, a small loss of only 0.0006, with statistical significance of the
governance variable also little changed. For this dataset and this application, the simple
sum of the attributes and the CGQ are close substitutes. Regression results using the two
measures of governance strength are compared in Table 4.
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Table 4: Comparison of regression results using Industry CGQ versus a sum of all the
individual governance indicators that are coded as positive.
N=166
R Square
Adj R Square
Standard Error
F
F Significance

Sum of Attributes
0.23940
0.17974
0.03100
4.01307
0.00002

Coefficients
Intercept
-0.06086
Public Target
-0.01404
Cash
-0.00253
Stock
-0.00250
Deal Size
-0.20242
2003
0.01044
2004
0.01700
2005
0.00120
S&P 400
0.00999
S&P 600
0.01909
Russell 3000
0.00753
CGQ Universe
0.04130
Sum of Attributes 0.00173
Industry CGQ

Sum of Attributes
Industry CGQ

P-value
0.00669
0.01049
0.73034
0.65980
0.00006
0.18696
0.02118
0.86829
0.26650
0.02754
0.24902
0.00212
0.00452

CGQ
0.23987
0.18026
0.03099
4.02352
0.00002
Coefficients
*** -0.03197
** -0.01333
-0.00023
-0.00061
*** -0.20529
0.00291
** 0.01210
0.00003
0.01065
** 0.01978
0.00847
*** 0.04142
***
0.00032

P-value
0.01627
0.01503
0.97503
0.91537
0.00005
0.67186
0.07511
0.99692
0.23721
0.02345
0.20289
0.00206

**
**

***
*

**
***

0.00429 ***

Std Deviation Effect Size
5.3411
0.00922
26.0782
0.00823

*** (**), (*) significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level

I next use the investigation procedure in Brown and Caylor (2006), who use ISS
governance data to investigate the linkage between governance strength and firm value
represented by Tobin’s q. The procedure is to use three methods to identify the variables
within the 55 that seem to be the most important. Variables that are highlighted in at
least two of the three methods are then combined into an index. Brown and Caylor’s
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work results in an index of 7 variables. The first one is not usable in my dataset because
all the acquiring banks meet this criterion. The item in italics is not available in my
dataset because it is not included in the 2005 and 2006 data.
1. All directors attended 75% of board meetings or had a valid excuse
13. Governance guidelines are publicly disclosed
14. Annually elected board (no staggered board)
15. Directors are subject to stock ownership requirements
33b. Company either has no poison pill or a pill that was shareholder approved
47. No option repricing within last three years
53. Options grants align with company performance and reasonable burn rate

I refer to the usable 5 items as the BC5 index. It is not particularly good as a
representation of the entire governance dataset in this bank merger application. A
regression using this BC5 index as the independent variable of interest produces an
adjusted R squared of 0.13569, notably lower than that of the full sum, 0.1797. Full
regression results are in Table 5.
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Table 5: Regression results substituting the BC5 index, similar to the Gov-7 index from
Brown and Caylor (2006), for the industry CGQ.
N=166
R Square
Adj R Square
Standard Error
F

0.19855
0.13569
0.03182
3.15859

Coefficients
Intercept
-0.00262
Public Target -0.01396
Cash
0.00090
Stock
-0.00394
Deal Size
-0.20611
2003
-0.00205
2004
0.00718
2005
-0.00282
S&P 400
0.00870
S&P 600
0.01293
Russell 3000
0.00124
CGQ Universe 0.03017
BC5
0.00087

P-value
0.78438
0.01315 **
0.90388
0.49789
0.00007 ***
0.77155
0.33387
0.69895
0.34666
0.14466
0.84851
0.02417 **
0.77158

*** (**), (*) significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level

The first of the three approaches is to replace the CGQ with all of the 55 data items
together. Unlike Brown and Caylor (2006), I find no governance variables to be
significant at the 5% level in this approach.

The second approach is a stepwise regression, often an informative technique in its own
right. I find three variables to be significant at the 5% level. They are:
3. Board is controlled by more than 50% independent outside directors
30. Majority vote requirement to amend charter/bylaws (not supermajority)
39. Company has no pill or state does not endorse poison pills
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The third approach is to replace the CGQ with one governance variable and a summed
index of the remaining 54 items. This is done 55 times, in 55 separate regressions, for
each variable in turn. I find 5 variables to be significant at the 5% level. They include:
30. Majority vote requirement to amend charter/bylaws (not supermajority)
33b. Company either has no poison pill or a pill that was shareholder approved
39. Company has no pill or state does not endorse poison pills
53. Options grants align with company performance and reasonable burn rate
59. Directors are required to submit resignation upon a change in job
In this study, the intersection of the results of the three approaches yields two variables
that are highlighted in the second and third approaches. They are:
30. Majority vote requirement to amend charter/bylaws (not supermajority) (34% of
sample)
39. Company has no pill or state does not endorse poison pills (80% of sample)
An index composed of the sum of these two items has only 3 possible outcomes: 0
(15.7%), 1 (54.8%) and 2 (29.5%), thereby dividing the acquirers into high medium and
low governance strength. The regression using this two-factor index as a replacement for
the 55-factor index or the CGQ, shown in Table 6, produces an adjusted R squared of
0.2388, substantially higher than that of the fuller measures.
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Table 6: Regression results using a two-factor index to represent governance strength.
N=166
R Square
Adj R Square
Standard Error
F

0.29419
0.23883
0.02986
5.31435

Intercept
Public Target
Cash
Stock
Deal Size
2003
2004
2005
S&P 400
S&P 600
Russell 3000
CGQ Universe
two-factor index

Coefficients
-0.02011
-0.01379
-0.00046
-0.00133
-0.21847
-0.00243
0.00806
-0.00045
0.00654
0.01243
0.00081
0.02900
0.01635

P-value
0.01960
0.00912
0.94697
0.80859
0.00001
0.70642
0.20742
0.94722
0.44946
0.11947
0.88986
0.01748
0.00001

**
***

***

**
***

*** (**), (*) significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level

In interpreting these results, it may first be helpful to make the common distinction
between external and internal governance attributes. External attributes relate to the
amount of power outsiders to the company could exert. Internal attributes relate to how
leadership decisions are made, including in areas such as corporate strategy,
compensation, tenure, and the deployment of company resources.

External attributes primarily come into play as defenses against proxy fights and against
hostile takeovers. Defenses against proxy fights might include staggered 3-year terms for
board members rather than having members stand for election or re-election annually,
making it difficult for shareholders to call or introduce proposals at shareholder’s
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meeting, and not having shareholder cumulative voting rights. Defenses against hostile
takeovers include poison pills, incorporation in a takeover-hostile state, and requiring a
supermajority vote to approve mergers. The IRRC data, which I chose not to use in this
study, is composed of 24 governance attributes, most of which are external.

Poison pills are a particularly potent anti-takeover defense, which can indicate weak
governance. Note that the Brown and Caylor’s (2006) list of 7 key attributes only
contains two external attributes, one regarding poison pills and the other regarding annual
election of board members. Recall that there are fewer hostile mergers in the banking
industry than in the general corporate population. The existence of poison pills is a
relevant governance attribute in both friendly and hostile takeovers, requiring that the
selling management remove the pill so that the merger can proceed. In contrast, proxy
fights are by definition a hostile tactic. Therefore it is not surprising that a poison pill
attribute would be a particularly important external governance attribute in a bank merger
context, and that annual election of directors would be less important.

The Brown and Caylor (2006) study highlighted the importance of the ISS data item:
33b - Company has no pill or a pill that was shareholder approved. This bank merger
study reveals the importance of: 39 - Company has no pill or state does not endorse
poison pills. Note that many banks are state-chartered and state-regulated. Although
state banks do sometimes change their state of incorporation (sometimes via a merger), it
may be the case that banks tend to be less inclined to change their state of incorporation
than companies in the general population. Therefore the state’s legal environment
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regarding mergers may play more prominently into the effectiveness of external defenses.
It also may be the case that states that do not endorse poison pills may be less inclined to
support other anti-takeover measures.

One benefit of the ISS data is the large amount of detail on internal governance practices
that had been difficult to access in the past. The other governance attribute that has been
found to be particularly important in this study is: 30 - Majority vote requirement to
amend charter/bylaws. This is clearly a critical internal attribute, relating to how the
leaders of the organization are elected, constrained, and possibly removed. I would
suggest that it also serves as an external attribute in that it allows a majority of
shareholders to disassemble any anti-proxy fight defenses, perhaps at the urging of a
corporate raider. It certainly is important to ease corporate restructuring – of selling the
company in whole or in parts, or completely changing the location or focus of the bank,
or changing its management. Taken together, the two attributes found in this study to be
most related to the market reception of the announcement of a bank merger are key
measures of management entrenchment, a critical concept in this line of research (e.g.
Gompers et al. 2003).
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Chapter 8

Target Governance

Thus far the focus of this study has been the governance strength and detailed governance
attributes of the acquirer. In this section I investigate the association between the market
reaction at announcement and the overall governance strength and detailed attributes of
the target. Of the 216 events used in the earliest sections, there was ISS governance
coverage of only a portion the targets, which are typically much smaller than the
acquirers. Sixty targets that were independent entities had data available the year of the
announcement. Fifteen more had an ultimate parent entity for which data were available
in the year of the announcement, for a total of 75. Another 19 were independent entities
that did not have data available in the year of the announcement but had it available in the
prior year. The majority of these transactions were announced early in their respective
year of announcement, suggesting that coverage for that year was not further pursued by
ISS. Thus the total was 94 targets with governance data. Of these 91 were classified as
banks by ISS and 3 were classified in other industries. I dropped these 3 for the benefit
of working with a single target industry. Of the 91 remaining observations, one is from
2001, three from 2002 and one is in 2003 but relies on 2002 data. The 2001 and 2002
data contain CGQ figures but have much less detail regarding the component governance
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attributes. I choose to drop these 5 observations so that the analysis of the detailed
attributes to follow can be directly compared to the overall results that make use of the
CGQ, resulting in a dataset of 86 observations. The data are summarized in Table 7.
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Table 7: Summary of the data used to examine target governance and its effect on
acquirer shareholder wealth at announcement of a merger.

N=86

Mean

Median

Max

Min

Standard
Deviation

CAR
Acquirer Industry
CGQ
Target Industry CGQ

-0.0192

-0.0137

0.0766

-0.1264

0.0340

70.26
59.36

77.00
61.85

100.00
100.00

0.50
0.50

25.99
25.71

4.83%

2.50%

48.48% 0.02%

Deal / Acquirer
Total Assets, %

Count
All Cash
Hybrid Payment
All Stock

10
46
30

Event Year
2003
2004
2005
2006

16
30
14
26

Acquirer Market
Index
S&P 500
S&P 400
S&P 600
Russell 3000
CGQ Universe

36
9
11
30
5

Target Market Index
S&P 500
S&P 400
S&P 600
Russell 3000
CGQ Universe

8
5
4
25
44

7.13%
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Knowing that smaller entities tend to have weaker governance structures (Aggarwal and
Williamson 2006), we would expect the target group to have lower summary governance
scores. The data show this with a median CGQ of 77.00 for the acquirers and 61.85 for
the targets. Also, an inspection of the data at the detail level, rather than the summary
level, reveals that 51 of the 86 have an acquirer CGQ higher than the target.

Knowing that these targets are public entities, or have public ultimate parents, we would
expect a lower average CAR and the data display this. The average CAR of the 216
original events was -1.05% and this subset group of public banks buying public banks (or
from a public parent) has an average CAR of -1.92%.

The correlation between the industry CGQ of the acquirers and that of the targets is 0.29.
These data suggest that there is a tendency for acquirers with stronger governance to
acquire targets with stronger governance. Of course larger acquirers tend to purchase
larger targets, which could be a part of this correlation. I do a series of regressions with
acquirer CGQ as the independent variable of interest, various control variables, and target
CGQ as the dependent variable. Under all specifications of the model, the acquirer CGQ
is always significant at either the 1% or 5% level. Results are listed in Table 8. The
results show that in the context of this dataset, public US banks purchasing public US
banks (or from a public parent), acquirers with stronger governance tend to choose targets
with stronger governance. Hypothesis 3, that acquirers with stronger governance tend to
acquirer entities with weaker governance, is not supported. Indeed, the opposite is shown
to be true. One implication may be that the cost-benefit tradeoff of bringing stronger
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governance to an entity in a different, often weaker, regulatory environment (cross-border
mergers) may be distinctly different from the cost-benefit tradeoffs of bringing a US bank
with weak governance up to a stronger level of governance.
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Table 8: Regression results using target CGQ as the dependent variable. The three
regressions on the left do not include deal size. Lower regressions include more control
variables.
N=86
R Square

0.08371

R Square

0.10087

Adj R Square

0.07280

Adj R Square

0.07921

F

7.67416

F

4.65587

F Significance

0.00689

F Significance

0.01212

Coefficients

P-value

Coefficients

P-value

Intercept

39.25266

0.00000

***

Intercept

35.30006

0.00006

Acq Ind CGQ

0.28618

0.00689

***

Deal Size

47.97186

0.21168

Acq Ind CGQ

0.30946

0.00403

***
***

R Square

0.26035

R Square

0.26859

Adj R Square

0.17276

Adj R Square

0.17107

F

2.97240

F

2.75417

F Significance

0.00440

F Significance

0.00603

Coefficients

P-value

Coefficients

P-value

Intercept

58.54898

0.00002

***

Intercept

57.28072

0.00004

Acq Ind CGQ

0.28277

0.01615

**

Deal Size

40.51848

0.36099

Acq S&P 400

10.14348

0.27915

Acq Ind CGQ

0.28109

0.01692

Acq S&P 600

4.28206

0.65492

Acq S&P 400

10.05946

0.28368

Acq Russell

20.08204

0.00857

Acq S&P 600

2.67392

0.78382

Acq CGQ Univ

1.28833

0.92024

Acq Russell

17.79711

0.02631

Trgt S&P 400

-14.62965

0.28064

Acq CGQ Univ

-5.59654

0.70758

Trgt S&P 600

-31.27442

0.03714

**

Trgt S&P 400

-17.01933

0.21886

Trgt Russell

-27.35698

0.00998

***

Trgt S&P 600

-31.14174

0.03817

**

Trgt CGQ Univ

-34.18158

0.00149

***

Trgt Russell

-27.29163

0.01025

**

Trgt CGQ Univ

-32.31573

0.00311

***

***

R Square

0.28610

R Square

0.29103

Adj R Square

0.14533

Adj R Square

0.13910

F

2.03241

F

1.91561

F Significance

0.02698

F Significance

0.03592

Coefficients

P-value

Coefficients

P-value

Intercept

51.20163

0.00199

***

Intercept

51.38588

0.00201

Acq Ind CGQ

0.33838

0.00971

***

Deal Size

32.06272

0.48789

Acq S&P 400

11.05174

0.25664

Acq Ind CGQ

0.33109

0.01190

Acq S&P 600

5.30535

0.60087

Acq S&P 400

10.75669

0.27167

***
**

**

***
**
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Acq S&P 600

3.68321

0.72419

0.86767

Acq Russell

18.37978

0.02963

-16.35008

0.24631

Acq CGQ Univ

-3.62443

0.82050

Trgt S&P 600

-30.02674

0.05395

*

Trgt S&P 400

-18.24608

0.20613

Trgt Russell

-25.67110

0.02066

**

Trgt S&P 600

-30.10795

0.05423

*

Trgt CGQ Univ

-32.44469

0.00397

***

Trgt Russell

-25.79063

0.02059

**

2003

-0.62257

0.93750

Trgt CGQ Univ

-30.96604

0.00698

***

2004

3.75776

0.58425

2003

-0.82323

0.91777

2005

0.00870

0.99917

2004

3.20463

0.64409

Cash

-8.04003

0.36132

2005

-0.33780

0.96813

Stock

4.18418

0.50182

Cash

-8.28765

0.34898

Stock

3.50016

0.58012

Acq Russell

20.37071

0.01043

Acq CGQ Univ

2.24962

Trgt S&P 400

**

*** (**), (*) significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level

I next seek to examine the effects of target governance strength, and the difference
between acquirer and target governance strength, on acquirer equity prices at
announcement. I add the target governance to the regression model used to predict the
market reaction for the complete dataset of 216 events. I drop the public target indicator
since all companies followed by ISS are public. I also add the target’s index group as a
control variable, cognizant of the fact that it also represents the absolute size of the target.
I believe that it is different enough from the relative deal size indicator in the model
which is deal size / acquirer’s total assets. Results of the regression are shown in Table 9.
At 0.0022 the coefficient on the target’s CGQ is about half of that on the acquirer’s,
0.0050. Recall that both have about the same standard deviation of approximately 26, so
that a change of one standard deviation in the target’s governance measure would have
just under half the effect of a one standard deviation change in the acquirer’s governance
measure. Although the coefficient on the target’s CGQ is not significant at conventional
levels, it does have a p-value of 0.147, lending some evidence to the notion that investors
are more pleased with targets with strong governance than with weak governance. This

***
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is different from the result in the literature in which, regarding cross-border mergers, the
market seemed to penalize the acquirer less the lower the governance strength of the
target (Hagendorff et al. 2008).
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Table 9: Results of the regression including the target’s governance strength and target
index as a set of control variables.
N=86
R Square
Adj R Square
Standard Error
F
F Significance

Intercept
Size
Acq S&P 400
Acq S&P 600
Acq Russell 3000
Acq CGQ Univ
Acq Industry
CGQ
Target S&P 400
Target S&P 600
Target Russell
3000
Target CGQ Univ
Trgt Industry
CGQ
2003
2004
2005
Cash
Stock

0.36319
0.21552
0.03014
3.06552
0.00524
Coefficients
-0.07718
-0.22077
0.00732
0.02295
0.00974
0.04962

P-value
0.00067
0.00032
0.55599
0.08528
0.37128
0.01613

0.00050
0.00351
-0.02278

0.00410 ***
0.84823
0.25750

0.00499
0.00481

0.72805
0.74675

0.00022
0.00917
0.01258
0.00094
0.00267
0.00165

0.14678
0.36433
0.15455
0.92984
0.81158
0.83694

***
***
*
**

*** (**), (*) significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level

Because the difference between the acquirer’s CGQ and the target’s CGQ is a linear
function of the two, replacing the target’s CGQ with the difference in the regression does
not produce additional insight. A regression using neither the target’s nor the acquirer’s
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CGQ, but only the difference, reprinted in Table 10, produces an extremely small
coefficient for the difference which is not statistically significant.
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Table 10: Results of a regression examining the effect of the difference between the
target and acquirer CGQ on acquirer shareholder wealth at announcement.
N=86
R Square
Adj R Square
Standard Error
F
F Significance

0.23009
0.06511
0.03291
1.39463
0.17446

Coefficients
Intercept
-0.00983
Deal Size
-0.19577
Cash
0.00390
Stock
-0.00295
2003
0.00142
2004
0.00705
2005
-0.00638
Acq S&P 400
0.00747
Acq S&P 600
0.00970
Acq Russell
0.00216
Acq CGQ Univ
0.02469
Target S&P 400
-0.00190
Target S&P 600
-0.03393
Target Russell
-0.00690
Target CGQ Univ -0.00466
CGQ difference 0.00008

P-value
0.47185
0.00282 ***
0.74993
0.73283
0.89537
0.45604
0.57877
0.58212
0.48572
0.85312
0.23819
0.92422
0.11979
0.65181
0.77121
0.56032

*** (**), (*) significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level

Finally I attempt to examine the question by using both the levels of the two CGQs and
the difference between them when they are formatted as standardized variables. This
difference is the number of standard deviations one variable is from its mean minus the
number of standard deviations that the other variable is from its mean. Recall that the
standard deviations of the two variables are almost the same. The results, not presented,
indicate that this is too close to a linear combination of the variables to be useful.
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These results show that hypothesis 4 is not supported. Weaker governance at the target is
not associated with less destruction of shareholder wealth. In fact the opposite
conclusion is suggested, although not at statistical significance. US bank targets with
stronger governance may be more attractive targets for acquirers. Perhaps one reason for
the lack of statistical significance is the sample size. Statistical significance might
emerge in future research with a larger sample size.

Next I examine the detailed data regarding the individual governance attributes of the
targets to see if there are attributes that are particularly meaningful to the market at the
time of a merger announcement. I again follow the Brown and Caylor (2006) procedure
for examining the detail target governance attribute data, similar to the process performed
above for the acquirers. This procedure involves putting the data through three statistical
procedures and then focusing on attributes that at least two of the procedures designate as
significant.

The first procedure is to replace the target CGQ with all 55 of the detailed attributes and
see which, if any, are significant at the 5% level. The result is two attributes:
2. CEO serves on the boards of two or fewer public companies
5. CEO is not listed as having a related-party transaction
Note that #2 is given a negative coefficient, -0.181, suggesting that for these small
companies, a CEO that is more connected to other public companies may be have
advantages that outweigh the disadvantages of the distraction.
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The second procedure is a stepwise regression which includes the 55 attributes. Six
attributes are found to be significant:
3. Board is controlled by more than 50% independent outside directors
16. Executives are subject to stock ownership guidelines
17. Policy exists on outside directorships (four or fewer boards is the limit)
31. Poison pill with a trigger >= 20%
33b. Company has no pill or a pill that was shareholder approved
49. All stock-incentive plans adopted with shareholder approval
The third procedure is to perform 55 separate regressions and in each one use one
attribute on a stand-alone basis and also use an index of the sum of the remaining 54.
Five attributes are found to be significant using this procedure:
17. Policy exists on outside directorships (four or fewer boards is the limit)
28. Majority vote requirement to approve mergers (not supermajority)
49. All stock-incentive plans adopted with shareholder approval
50. The last time shareholders voted on an option plan, ISS deemed the cost reasonable
52. Repricing prohibited
The intersection of the results of these three procedures produces two attributes:
17. Policy exists on outside directorships (four or fewer boards is the limit)
49. All stock-incentive plans adopted with shareholder approval
Each attribute is satisfied by 8 banks in the sample (9.3% each) and there is no overlap,
so 70 banks of the 86 do not satisfy either. A regression using this two-factor index as
representative of what might be received positively by market participants at the time of
announcement, Table 11, shows no compelling or suggestive results.
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Table 11: Results of a regression using a sum of target attributes number 17 and 49 as
the indicator of target governance strength.
N=86
R Square
Adj R Square
Standard Error
F
F Significance

0.39775
0.25810
0.02732
2.84821
0.00136

Intercept
Size
Acq S&P 400
Acq S&P 600
Acq Russell 3000
Acq CGQ Univ
Acq Industry CGQ
Target S&P 400
Target S&P 600
Target Russell 3000
Target CGQ Univ
17+49
2003
2004
2005
Cash
Stock

Coefficients
-0.06332
-0.23085
0.00765
0.01689
0.01887
0.04485
0.00046
-0.00028
-0.03927
-0.00290
-0.00772
0.00347
0.02226
0.01416
0.01646
0.01126
0.00622

P-value
0.00097
0.00004
0.49400
0.16732
0.05237
0.01803
0.00312
0.98655
0.03171
0.82667
0.57555
0.71065
0.01792
0.07963
0.09264
0.26984
0.40672

***

**
***
**

**

*** (**), (*) significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level

Overall, this dataset does not yield statistically conclusive evidence about target
governance playing a role in changes in acquirer shareholder wealth at the time of a
merger announcement between US public banks. The dataset does definitively depict a
pattern of acquirers with strong governance tending to select targets with strong
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governance, the opposite of H3, and it does suggest that market participants may be
viewing mergers involving targets with stronger governance more favorably at the time
of announcement, the opposite of H4.
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Chapter 9

Bank Index

In this section I perform a robustness check of the major results of the study by replacing
the CRSP equal-weighted market return index with the Datastream US Bank total return
index. By moving from an overall market index to an industry sector index, the effects of
industry trends and shocks are brought to bear on the results.

My first step is to retrieve the raw CRSP data. I then manually reproduce the work done
up to this point by Eventus to create the CAR values, using the CRSP equal-weighted
market index to represent market movements. My calculated results match the Eventus
results exactly. I then repeat the CAR calculations using the same raw stock return data
but the Datastream US Bank total return index instead of the CRSP market index. A
comparison of the two sets of CAR results is in Table 12 below.
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Table 12: A comparison of the CAR values created using the CRSP equal-weighted
market index and using the Datastream US Bank total return index.
N=216
CARs Using
Datastream
US
Bank Index

CARs Using
EqualWeighted
CRSP Index

Mean

-0.0108

-0.0105

Maximum

0.0853

0.0963

Minimum

-0.1264

*

-0.1264

Standard
Deviation

0.0313

*

0.0313

Number
Negative

144

Correlation

137
0.88

* These numbers are equal simply by coincidence
The two minimums are not the same event

The first hypothesis of this study, H1, that bank mergers tend to destroy shareholder
wealth at announcement on average, is upheld. The average CAR using the bank index is
-1.08% versus -1.05% for the overall market index. The number of negative results is
144, two thirds of the sample, and is farther from the null hypothesis of an even split than
the 137 negative results using the market index. Using the generalized sign test this
result is significant at the 1% level. H1 is supported.
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The second hypothesis, H2, that weaker corporate governance at the firm level is
associated with greater destruction of shareholder wealth at announcement on average, is
(re)examined via regressing the CAR on the governance indicator, the CGQ, and control
variables. The results are shown in Table 13. The CGQ of the acquirer remains
statistically significant with the new index, although at the 5% rather than the 1% level.
H2 is supported.
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Table 13: Results of regressing the cumulative abnormal return, CAR, on the governance
strength indicator of the firm, the CGQ, and control variables. One regression uses the
CRSP equal-weighted index to represent the market movements and the other uses the
Datastream US Bank total return index.
Datastream US
N=216
Bank Index
R Square
0.23308
Adj R Square 0.17966
Standard
Error
0.02836
F
4.36341
F
Significance 9E-07

Intercept
Public
Target
Cash
Stock
Deal Size
Industry
CGQ
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
S&P 400
S&P 600
Russell 3000
CGQ
Universe

Coefficients P-value
-0.02300
0.02273 **
-0.01509
0.00204
0.00477
-0.19466

0.00055 ***
0.71489
0.30350
0.00001 ***

0.00018
0.01594
0.02450
0.00749
0.00783
0.00439
0.01217
0.00998
0.00758

0.03559 **
0.03332 **
0.00230 ***
0.22984
0.20234
0.50019
0.05892
0.13889
0.14489

0.03235

0.00596 ***

N=216
R Square
Adj R Square
Standard
Error
F
F
Significance

Intercept
Public
Target
Cash
Stock
Deal Size
Industry
CGQ
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
S&P 400
S&P 600
Russell 3000
CGQ
Universe

*** (**), (*) significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level

CRSP Equal-Weighted
Market Index
0.2304
0.17679
0.03214
4.29816
1.2E-06
Coefficients P-value
-0.02796
0.01464 **
-0.014

0.00449 ***

0.00149
0.00171
-0.19916

0.81293
0.74414
0.00008 ***

0.00028

0.00429 ***

0.01033
0.03112
0.00222
0.01069
-0.00064
0.01412
0.01435
0.00646

0.22178
0.00066 ***
0.75353
0.12471
0.93065
0.05311
0.06098
0.27271

0.03912

0.00339 ***
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The third hypothesis, H3, that acquirers with stronger governance tend to acquire entities
with weaker governance, is not reexamined because the testing of the hypothesis does not
make use of the CAR values. Recall that the finding was just the opposite of the stated
hypothesis and was statistically significant. Acquirers with strong governance tend to
choose targets with strong governance.

The fourth hypothesis, H4, is that targets with weaker governance strength are associated
with less destruction of shareholder wealth at announcement. The finding was the
opposite of the stated hypothesis but was not statistically significant, only statistically
suggestive. Switching to the bank index does not improve the statistical significance of
the results. In fact the relevant p-value is slightly larger using the bank index, moving
from 0.147 to 0.192. The results, shown in Table 14, suggest that targets with weaker
governance strength are associated with more destruction of shareholder wealth at
announcement.
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Table 14: Results of regressing CAR values on the governance strength indicators,
CGQs, of both the acquirer and the targets, and on control variables. The two sets of
results use two different market indexes to create the CAR values.
Datastream US

CRSP Equal-Weighted

N=86

Bank Index

N=86

Market Index

R Square

0.41136

R Square

0.36319

Adj R Square

0.27487

Adj R Square

0.21552

Standard Error

0.02701

Standard Error

0.03014

F

3.01374

F

3.06552

F Significance

0.00077

F Significance

0.00524

Coefficients

P-value

Coefficients

P-value

Intercept

-0.07209

0.00041

***

Intercept

-0.07718

0.00067

***

Size
Acq S&P 400

-0.23721
0.00588

0.00002
0.59752

***

Size
Acq S&P 400

-0.22077
0.00732

0.00032
0.55599

***

Acq S&P 600

0.01703

0.15272

**

Acq S&P 600
Acq Russell
3000

0.02295

0.08528

*

Acq Russell 3000

0.01604

0.10270

0.00974

0.37128

Acq CGQ Univ

0.04672

0.01164

**

Acq CGQ Univ

0.04962

0.01613

**

Acq Ind CGQ
Target S&P 400

0.00042
0.00293

0.00728
0.85829

***

Acq Ind CGQ
Target S&P 400

0.00050
0.00351

0.00410
0.84823

***

Target S&P 600

-0.03512

0.05353

-0.02278

0.25750

Trgt Russell 3000

0.00010

0.99375

0.00499

0.72805

Target CGQ Univ

-0.00408

0.75988

Target S&P 600
Trgt Russell
3000
Target CGQ
Univ

0.00481

0.74675

Trgt Ind CGQ
2003

0.00018
0.02286

0.19188
0.01329

Trgt Ind CGQ
2003

0.00022
0.00917

0.14678
0.36433

2004

0.01392

0.07988

2004

0.01258

0.15455

2005

0.01660

0.08620

2005

0.00094

0.92984

Cash

0.01234

0.22222

Cash

0.00267

0.81158

Stock

0.00630

0.38135

Stock

0.00165

0.83694

*** (**), (*) significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level

Overall the results using the bank index are close to those using the overall market index,
indicating robustness of the results.
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Chapter 10

Conclusion

The academic literature reveals that on average shareholders of banks either lose wealth
or do not increase it upon the announcement of an acquisition. Academics have
speculated that the reason this acquisition behavior continues is that shareholders have a
difficult time controlling, or governing, their agents. Other academic research has
documented the compensation incentives for CEOs to make acquisitions. This study asks
whether we can determine that weak governance structures at the firm level are correlated
with, and thus may contribute to, the selection of acquisitions that are more poorly
received by market participants.

A unique dataset combining merger events with equity price movements and
commercially-sold governance assessments was created to investigate the question. With
statistically significant results, the finding is that stronger corporate governance by
shareholders is associated with better acquirer shareholder wealth outcomes upon
announcement.
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An investigation is done to examine which governance attributes seem to be the most
closely associated with the equity market reception of a merger announcement. The
surprising result is that an index of only two of the 55 variables carries at least the
explanatory power of indexes containing all 55 attributes in this bank merger context.

Additionally, where governance data are available for the targets that are banks, it is
examined for an association to the market reaction to the merger announcement. It is also
examined to discern which governance attributes may seem to be the most important in
influencing the market reaction. The results indicate that acquirers with relatively
stronger governance tend to select targets with relatively stronger governance. The
results also somewhat suggest that market participants react more favorably to merger
announcements involving targets with relatively stronger governance.
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Appendix 1
Aggarwal and Williamson (2006) presented the detailed ISS data organized as below. I
have compiled the data in the same way for the 216 acquiring banks in this study. I show
Aggarwal and Williamson’s 2003 and 2005 data from a broad range of companies,
excluding financial companies, for comparison. I do not have 2005 and 2006 data for the
items in italics. I have divided item 33 into its two component parts. The items that
have 100% or 0% compliance will not be used in further regression analysis.
Piskula
Difference
Acquiring
Banks less
2003
2005
Banks
A&W '05
1. All directors attended 75% of board meetings or had a valid excuse
93.0%
99.8%
0.2%
100%
2. CEO serves on the boards of two or fewer public companies
95.9%
98.4%
-2.0%
96%
3. Board is controlled by more than 50% independent outside directors
69.3%
88.4%
7.4%
96%
4. Board size is at greater than five but less than16
81.1%
82.4%
-13.1%
69%
5. CEO is not listed as having a related-party transaction
75.3%
81.3%
13.9%
95%
6. No former CEO on the board
81.6%
78.3%
3.6%
82%
7. Compensation committee comprised solely of independent outsiders
62.1%
75.4%
-20.6%
55%
8. Chairman and CEO are separated or there is a lead director
52.6%
73.8%
-28.0%
46%
9. Nominating committee comprised solely of independent outsiders
22.6%
62.2%
-14.0%
48%
10. Outsider controlled board or board controlled by 50% to 75% of independent
outsiders with officer and director ownership between 5% to 30%
45.5%
59.8%
-26.1%
34%
11. Governance committee exists and met in the past year
16.2%
55.0%
17.3%
72%
12. Shareholders vote on directors selected to fill vacancies
33.6%
53.0%
-14.4%
39%
13. Governance guidelines are publicly disclosed
6.1%
49.3%
8.5%
58%
14. Annually elected board (no staggered board)
44.5%
47.3%
-4.5%
43%
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Appendix 1, continued
Piskula
Difference
Acquiring
Banks less
2003
2005
Banks
A&W '05
15. Directors are subject to stock ownership requirements
4.6%
14.2%
15.3%
30%
16. Executives are subject to stock ownership guidelines
6.7%
12.1%
13.8%
26%
17. Policy exists on outside directorships (four or fewer boards is the limit)
0.6%
9.3%
6.4%
16%
18. Shareholders have cumulative voting rights
7.9%
7.6%
-1.6%
6%
19. Shareholder approval is required to increase/decrease board size
20.2%
3.8%
-1.4%
2%
20. Qualifies for proxy contest defenses combination points
1.0%
1.6%
3.2%
5%
21. Director term limits exist
0.6%
1.3%
22. Board controlled by 50% or more independent outsiders and all committees are
comprised solely of independent outsiders
14.7%
1.3%
40.9%
42%
AUDIT
23. Consulting fees paid to auditors are less than audit fees paid to auditors
64.0%
98.0%
94%
24. Audit committee comprised solely of independent outsiders
70.3%
86.2%
62%
25. Auditors ratified at most recent annual meeting
56.4%
65.5%
61%
26. Policy disclosed regarding auditor rotation
2.8%
45.7%

-4.0%
-24.2%
-4.1%
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Appendix 1, continued

2003

2005

Piskula
Acquiring
Banks

Difference
Banks less
A&W '05

CHARTER
27. Single class, common
91.9%
94.1%
-39.3%
55%
28. Majority vote requirement to approve mergers (not supermajority)
59.4%
63.5%
-18.9%
45%
29. Shareholders may call special meetings
39.6%
44.3%
12.3%
57%
30. Majority vote requirement to amend charter/bylaws (not supermajority)
42.9%
44.2%
-9.9%
34%
31. Poison pill with a trigger >= 20%
26.1%
24.4%
-19.0%
5%
32. Shareholder may act by written consent
20.4%
23.9%
-4.6%
19%
33. Company is not authorized to issue blank check preferred and either has no
poison pill or a pill that was shareholder approved.
10.5%
11.2%
33a. Company is not authorized to issue blank check preferred
2.7%
14%
33b. Company has no pill or a pill that was shareholder approved
66%
34. Poison pill with a qualified offer clause
3.0%
7.5%
-5.1%
2%
35. Poison pill with TIDE provision
1.6%
4.3%
-4.3%
0%
36. Board cannot amend bylaws without shareholder approval or can only do so
under limited
circumstances
2.0%
2.1%
33.4%
36%
37. Poison pill with sunset provision
0.3%
0.4%
-0.4%
0%
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Appendix 1, continued

2003

2005

Piskula
Acquiring
Banks

Difference
Banks less
A&W '05

STATE
38. Incorporation in state w/o a control share cash-out statute, or with a control
share cash-out statute but company has opted out
97.5%
98.1%
-5.9%
92%
39. Company has no pill or state does not endorse poison pills
88.4%
89.4%
-9.9%
80%
40. Incorporation in a state without stakeholder laws, or independent directors
comprise 75% or more of the board
77.7%
79.3%
-4.6%
75%
41. Incorporation in state w/o a control share acquisition statue, or with a control
share acquisition statute but company has opted out
77.3%
78.8%
-11.9%
67%
42. Incorporation in state with a fair price provision
32.1%
31.5%
19.7%
51%
43. Incorporation in state w/o a freezeout provision, or with a freezeout but
company has opted out
14.7%
16.0%
13.5%
30%
44. Incorporation in state without any state anti-takeover provisions
4.0%
3.8%
3.4%
7%
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Appendix 1, continued

2003

2005

Piskula
Acquiring
Banks

Difference
Banks less
A&W '05

COMPENSATION
45. No interlocks among compensation committee members
98.6%
100.0%
0.0%
100%
46. Non-employee directors participate in pension plan
96.6%
98.0%
47. No option repricing within last three years
94.3%
91.6%
48. Directors receive all or a portion of their fees in stock
84.5%
84.7%
-1.0%
84%
49. All stock-incentive plans adopted with shareholder approval
92.4%
84.3%
5.5%
90%
50. The last time shareholders voted on an option plan, ISS deemed the cost
reasonable
62.9%
69.8%
0.1%
70%
51. Company does not provide any loans to executives for exercising options
82.0%
60.9%
52. Repricing prohibited
15.5%
31.9%
-13.8%
18%
53. Options grants align with company performance and reasonable burn rate
20.3%
24.6%
37.4%
62%
54. Company expenses stock options
2.6%
9.6%
4.9%
14%
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Appendix 1, continued
Piskula
Acquiring
Banks

Difference
Banks less
A&W '05

2003
2005
PROGRESSIVE PRACTICES
55. Board has the express authority to hire its own advisors
5.3%
90.7%
79%
56. Performance of the board is reviewed regularly
6.8%
61.0%
67%
57. Board approved succession plan in place for the CEO
5.4%
44.9%
49%
58. Outside directors meet without CEO and disclose number of times met
1.7%
42.4%
62%
59. Directors are required to submit resignation upon a change in job
4.1%
20.6%
38%
60. Mandatory retirement age for directors
7.8%
18.2%

-11.8%
6.5%
3.9%
19.6%
17.4%

OWNERSHIP
61. Does not ignore shareholder proposal
99.6%
99.2%
0.2%
99%
62. All directors with more than one year of service own stock
93.1%
87.2%
6.8%
94%
63. Officers’ and directors’ stock ownership is at least 1% but not over 30% of total
shares
outstanding
69.1%
72.3%
18.7%
91%
DIRECTOR EDUCATION
64. Majority of directors have participated in a director education program.
0.1%
2.2%
2%

0.2%
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